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HALLIBURTON AND THE
INTEGRITY OF THE PUBLIC
CORPORATION
JAMES J. PARK*
INTRODUCTION
When a market for a stock is efficient, the fraud-on-the-market
presumption requires courts to initially assume that investors who
bought the stock relied on the integrity of the market price. This
presumption is critical in establishing the common reliance necessary
to certify a class when such investors assert a securities fraud claim
under SEC Rule 10b-5. The validity of the fraud-on-the-market
presumption rests on two related propositions. The first is descriptive:
a company’s stock price in an efficient market will incorporate
publicly released information about the company and its economic
prospects; thus securities fraud will inflate the price investors pay for
the stock. The second is normative: investors can reasonably rely on
the integrity of public stock markets when purchasing stock.
This Article primarily assesses the second proposition. Because
stock prices are often inaccurate, critics commonly argue that markets
do not have integrity. Rather than resting the reasonableness of
investor reliance on what I will refer to as “market price integrity,”
this Article argues that the integrity of public markets is best
grounded in the regulatory structure governing which corporations
can be publicly traded. Put another way, the fraud-on-the-market
presumption is best justified not because of an expectation that stock
market prices are precisely accurate, but on what I will call the
“integrity of the public corporation.” Even if investors cannot
reasonably believe that fraud in an efficient market is uncommon,
securities laws increasingly seek to create public markets in which
investors can reasonably expect that severe frauds will be rare. Such
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reliance is clearly disrupted when fraud hides information indicating
that a company should be delisted or is heading towards bankruptcy.
I. TWO THEORIES OF MARKET EFFICIENCY AND INTEGRITY
1

In Halliburton v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., the United States
Supreme Court considered whether federal courts should continue to
apply the fraud-on-the-market presumption to the typical securities
2
fraud class action, which asserts claims under Rule 10b-5. In the
briefs contending that the presumption should be eliminated, the
essence of the argument was that investors simply cannot trust market
prices because history has shown they are often inflated by noise and
3
irrational expectations. Years earlier, the Supreme Court in Basic Inc.
4
v. Levinson had rejected this argument, concluding that an investor
can rely on the integrity of stock prices in an efficient market, and the
Court in Halliburton affirmed Basic on this point while providing
5
some additional analysis to support its conclusion.
This Part unpacks the concept of market price integrity discussed
by the Court in both Basic and Levinson. In doing so, it argues that
the descriptive and normative foundations of the efficient markets
hypothesis are closely related. To the extent that markets can be
described as accurate in valuing securities, the normative case for
investor reliance on market prices is stronger. When resting on the
weaker claim that markets react to information but do not necessarily
value stocks correctly, the argument that market prices have integrity
is not as persuasive.
A. Market Prices Reflect Fundamental Value
The strongest case for market price integrity is based on the belief
that stock markets are fundamentally efficient. Under this view,
markets not only incorporate public information about the company’s
6
stock price, they usually do so correctly.

1. 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014).
2. 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (2015).
3. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioners at 17, Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S.
Ct. 2398 (2014) (No. 13-317) (“Basic’s presumption of reliance cannot coexist with the reality
that where one would expect maximum market efficiency and rationality, markets can prove
extraordinarily inefficient and irrational.”).
4. 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
5. See Halliburton, 134 S. Ct. at 2407 (2014).
6. For a recent discussion of the hypothesis, see Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman,
Market Efficiency After the Financial Crisis: It’s Still a Matter of Information Costs, 100 VA. L.
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This bold descriptive claim about the functioning of an efficient
market has implications for what investors can expect when investing
in that market. If a market for a stock is fundamentally efficient, an
investor can believe that the price of that stock largely reflects its
value. If stock prices are accurate in this way, buying stock can easily
be distinguished from gambling at a casino. Rather than simply
making a bet, a stock investor has bought something of real worth. It
should also be futile for traders to earn significant profits by searching
for misvalued stocks because market prices will tend to be correct.
Securities fraud disrupts these assumptions about a fundamentally
efficient market. When a company commits fraud, investors will pay a
price for the security that does not reflect its actual value and suffer
losses when the truth is revealed.
The Basic and Halliburton decisions do not directly refer to
fundamental value when discussing market price integrity. It is the
dissent in Basic that raises the issue, arguing that the majority’s view
reflects the erroneous assumption that markets are fundamentally
7
efficient. Pointing to the majority’s citation of a district court opinion
asserting that investors can “rely on the price of a stock as reflection
of its value,” the dissent argued that the majority “implicitly suggests
that stocks have some ‘true value’ that is measurable by a standard
8
other than their market price.”
Both the Basic and Halliburton dissents criticize the idea that
markets are fundamentally efficient. They do so primarily by invoking
the value investor, an investor who buys stock believing it is
underpriced in that it trades at a price below its actual value. The
value investor does not believe that the market price has integrity in
the fundamental sense, but instead tries to exploit, for profit,
inefficiencies in the market.
The existence and success of value investors is a problem for the
fraud-on-the-market presumption in two ways. First, the ability of
such investors to earn abnormal returns undermines the descriptive
point that stock markets are so efficient that such profits cannot be
made. Second, the presence of value investors undermines the
normative point that investors can reasonably believe that market
prices reflect the value of their investment.

REV. 313 (2013).
7. Basic, 485 U.S. at 255.
8. Id.
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The Halliburton decision responds to these arguments on two
grounds. The first is that “most” investors do not fit into the category
9
of value investors. In the Court’s words, the majority of investors
know “they have little hope of outperforming the market in the long
run;” thus they “will rely on the security’s market price as an unbiased
10
assessment of the security’s value in light of all public information.”
The second is that even value investors rely on the belief that market
11
prices will eventually reflect fundamental value.
The first response does not convincingly show that value investors
are unimportant. Even taking at face value the assertion that “most”
investors are not value investors, it is difficult to deny that many
investors take on a value approach. It may be the case that value
investors are outnumbered by passive investors, but investors who
assess whether or not market prices reflect fundamental value do
12
more to set market prices than passive investors. Moreover, the
question is not solely whether or not there are more value investors
than passive investors; the mere existence of value investors should
signal to passive investors that they cannot naively believe that
market prices reflect the value of a stock.
The second argument essentially contends that even if there are
inefficiencies in the market price, investors rely on the belief that
market prices are eventually correct. The Court notes that for a value
investing strategy to succeed, the stock must return to its fundamental
value. Such an investor will calculate the extent to which the stock has
diverged from such value, “and such estimates can be skewed by a
13
market price tainted by fraud.”
This is a stronger argument than the first, but it is somewhat
unclear what the Court means. Typically, value investors look for
stocks that are underpriced by the market. Yet fraud tends to inflate
the price of a stock. Perhaps there will be cases where a value investor
believes a stock trading at $10 a share is worth $15 a share, but it turns
out that the company is committing a fraud and the stock is only

9. Halliburton, 134 S. Ct. at 11–12.
10. Id. at 12.
11. Id. (“[A]n investor implicitly relies on the fact that a stock market’s price will
eventually reflect material information. . . .”).
12. For an argument that this price discovery is the “essential” role of the securities laws,
see Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of Securities Regulation, 55
DUKE L.J. 711 (2006).
13. Halliburton, 134 S. Ct. at 12.
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worth $5 a share. The value investor suffers damages, so there is an
argument that he should be able to recover the difference. On the
other hand, given the value investor’s belief that market prices are
often incorrect, it is difficult to base the case for protecting such an
investor on the theory that market prices are fundamentally correct.
B. Market Prices Are Not Distorted by Fraud
The weaker view of market price integrity would not require
fundamental efficiency but only that market prices reflect public
information. Even if stock prices do not accurately measure the true
value of a stock, if a market is informationally efficient, stock prices
will incorporate fraudulent statements. Put another way, if a fraud
inflates earnings by 10 percent, that misstatement will also inflate the
stock price trading in an efficient market by some amount. Even if the
stock price does not accurately measure the fundamental value of the
company, an investor has still paid more for the stock with the
misrepresentation, and arguably should be able to recover damages.
To say that markets have integrity does not mean that stock prices are
usually right, but simply that investors should be able to rely on the
assumption that the market price is not inflated by fraud.
The Court in Basic relied in part on this absence-of-fraud form of
14
market price integrity. The majority opinion noted that “the market
price of shares traded on well-developed markets reflects all publicly
15
available information, and, hence, any material misrepresentations.”
According to the Court, all investors rely on the absence of fraud
16
because they would not invest in what was “a crooked crap game.”
Market price integrity as absence of fraud is easier to defend than
market price integrity as fundamental value. Even if there is no
knowable intrinsic value of a stock, because fraud causes a relative
increase in what investors are paying, it is possible to conclude that
investors would be paying less for a stock in the absence of fraud.
Even a value investor, who relies on the belief that a stock is

14. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, The Trouble With Basic: Price Distortion After Halliburton, 90
WASH. U. L. REV. 895, 897 (2013) (noting that the Court in Basic “constructed a complex
theory of market integrity relying on the fact that, in an efficient market, fraudulent public
statements distort stock prices”). For an argument that fraudulent distortion of the market price
by itself should establish class-wide reliance, see Lucian A. Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, Rethinking
Basic, 69 BUS. LAW. 671 (2014).
15. Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 246 (1988).
16. Id.
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undervalued, would pay even less for that undervalued stock in the
absence of fraud.
On the other hand, conceding that markets are not fundamentally
efficient has its costs for the normative claim that market prices have
integrity. If markets are unable to distinguish between fraudulent and
non-fraudulent statements, investors should always expect a risk of
17
fraud. Investors can respond to such risk by discounting the price
they are willing to pay for a stock. Moreover, if markets cannot
distinguish between fraudulent and non-fraudulent statements, how
can they distinguish between useful information and noise? If a fraud
distorts a stock price by 5 percent but irrational expectations inflate
the price by 100 percent, the risk of fraud is relatively trivial with
respect to the overall volatility of a stock. If investors are willing to
invest knowing the historical ups and downs of market cycles, they
should be willing to invest even knowing that there is a modest risk of
fraud.
Perhaps the problem with the absence-of-fraud approach to
market price integrity is that it does not differentiate between types of
frauds. Even if investors should expect minor price distortions from
fraud, the complete collapse of a company’s stock price in the wake of
a fraud is not something that an investor should routinely expect. To
fully appreciate the integrity of public markets, one must thus look
beyond the accuracy of market prices to the regulatory framework
that seeks to prevent substantial frauds.
II. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH: INTEGRITY OF THE PUBLIC
CORPORATION
Rather than resting its case for the fraud-on-the-market
presumption on the accuracy of stock prices, this Article looks to the
legal framework governing public companies. Stock exchange rules
and federal law have long required companies to meet certain
standards before trading on public markets. These regulations have
become more stringent in requiring public companies to verify the
accuracy of their disclosures. Especially in light of these increasing
expectations, investors should be able to reasonably assume that a
public corporation meets basic standards of integrity.

17. See Donald C. Langevoort, Basic at Twenty: Rethinking Fraud on the Market, 2009
WIS. L. REV. 151, 160 (“Fraud and manipulation are predictable enough that it would be foolish
for anyone simply to assume that a stock price has integrity.”).
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A. Securities Laws, the Public Corporation, and Efficient Markets
The argument that stock markets cannot be trusted unfairly
dismisses the significant effort by private and public actors over the
years to construct norms and law to improve the integrity of public
companies. Though these mechanisms are imperfect, they attempt to
distinguish between those companies in which public investment is
appropriate and those in which it is not. If a company wants its stock
to trade on an efficient market, it must initially meet and continue to
meet the standard for being a public company.
Efficient markets do not exist without actors who facilitate the
valuation of the assets trading in that market. Professors Gilson and
Kraakman make this point in a famous article, The Mechanisms of
18
Market Efficiency. They note that while financial economists have
spent much time assessing whether a particular market is efficient,
they have not focused much effort on explaining which factors make a
19
market efficient. Professors Gilson and Kraakman identify some of
the institutions that facilitate market efficiency, such as research
20
analysts, who process new information about a company. Moreover,
they conclude that law is likely to play a role in that securities laws
21
operate to reduce the costs of processing and verifying information.
More recently, financial economists have become interested in the
role law plays in the development of trading markets. An extensive
body of research on law and finance has posited that common law
protections are associated with stronger securities markets, and
22
presented evidence to support the hypothesis. There is no consensus
as to the conclusiveness of these results, and the studies in measuring
the effect of law do not delve much into the details of how securities
law operates in facilitating the rise of markets. However, these
findings suggest that law matters in developing well-functioning
markets.
There are two major mechanisms of interest by which law and
private norms play a significant role in creating public markets that

18. Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70
VA. L. REV. 549 (1984).
19. Id. at 553 (“[D]espite the substantial progress that has been made, we still lack a single,
comprehensive explanation for the existence of market efficiency.”).
20. Id. at 571–72.
21. Id. at 601.
22. See, e.g., Rafael La Porta, et al., Investor Protection and Corporate Governance, 58 J.
FIN. ECON. 3, 4 (2000); Rafael La Porta, et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113 (1998).
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investors can trust. The first are the federal securities laws. The
23
24
Securities Act of 1933 and Securities Exchange Act of 1934 set
forth extensive requirements for companies that become public so
that they can be traded on markets. To sell securities to the public, a
company must have audited financial statements and file truthful
disclosures with the SEC. As one court noted, investors rely on the
“integrity of the regulatory process” and the “truth of any
25
representations” in purchasing newly issued securities. This reliance
26
continues as the company files periodic reports with the SEC. To the
extent that a public company fails to maintain these obligations, the
27
SEC has the power to “revoke the registration of a security.” In its
initial and continuing mandates, the federal securities laws define the
line between public and private companies.
The second is the private regulation set forth by stock exchanges.
In particular, the exchanges have listing requirements that must be
met before a company will trade on a market widely available to
28
public investors. According to the New York Stock Exchange,
meeting these standards “is internationally recognized as signifying
that a publicly owned corporation has achieved maturity and front29
rank status in its industry.” As one court has noted, a stock exchange
30
listing “carries with it implicit guarantees of trustworthiness.” There
is an understanding that “a company must meet certain qualifications
of financial stability, prestige, and fair disclosure, in order to be
23. Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77a to 77aa
(West 2015)).
24. Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78a to 78pp
(West 2015)).
25. Arthur Young & Co. v. U.S. District Court, 549 F.2d 686, 695 (9th Cir. 1977); but see
Malack v. BDO Seidman LLP, 617 F.3d 743, 750 (3d Cir. 2010) (noting that the SEC cannot be
expected to prevent fraud).
26. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78m (West 2015).
27. Id. at § 12(j), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78l (West 2015).
28. For example, the company must show an aggregate market value of $40 million for its
publicly-held shares to list on the New York Stock Exchange. New York Stock Exchange Listed
Company Manual § 102.01B [hereinafter NYSE Manual]. If the average market value of a
company over thirty days is less than $15 million, the Exchange will proceed to delist the
company. Id. at § 802.01B. The exchanges arguably have significant incentives to monitor its
listed companies. See generally A.C. Pritchard, Markets as Monitors: A Proposal To Replace
Class Actions with Exchanges as Securities Fraud Enforcers, 85 VA. L. REV. 925, 963–81 (1999).
29. NYSE Manual § 101.00; see also Samuel L. Rosenberry, Listing and Delisting Securities
on the New York Stock Exchange, 45 VA. L. REV. 897, 898 (1959) (“[T]he Exchange has
gradually developed listing standards which are designed to maintain a quality national and
international market for securities of well established companies in which there is a broad public
interest.”).
30. Van Gemert v. Boeing Co., 520 F.2d 1373, 1381 (2d Cir. 1975).
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accepted for that listing, which is in turn so helpful to the sale of the
31
company’s securities.” Thus, in setting forth listing requirements,
exchanges make determinations as to which companies should trade
in public markets.
B. The Rising Standard of Integrity for Public Companies
For more than a decade, the distinction between public and
private companies has been growing. There is now a much greater
expectation that public companies provide accurate disclosures and
have good corporate governance. Whether or not the cost of these
measures is justified, these efforts are designed to improve the
integrity of the public corporation.
The first set of increasing requirements relates to the reliability of
public company disclosures. The primary mechanism for this effort
has been to mandate that public companies maintain a certain level of
internal controls. These obligations were initially imposed through the
32
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act after the discovery that many
companies were secretly diverting assets to pay bribes in foreign
countries. Such conduct was seen as affecting the integrity of the use
of company assets. After the collapse of two major public companies,
Enron and WorldCom, Congress moved to address “[d]efects in
procedures for monitoring financial results and controls” that were
33
“blamed for recent corporate failures.” Congress then passed the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which requires an assessment of the adequacy of
a public company’s internal controls by both auditors and
34
management. Commentators have noted that these provisions
“produced the sharpest cleavage in terms of differentiating public
35
companies.”
The second set of requirements relates to the governance of
public corporations. The New York Stock Exchange has enhanced its
listing rules with corporate governance requirements “aimed at
maintaining appropriate standards of corporate responsibility,

31. Id.
32. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78dd-1 to 78dd-3 (West 2015).
33. S. REP. NO. 107-205, at 23 (2002).
34. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 404, 15 U.S.C.A. § 7262 (West 2015). SarbanesOxley also makes efforts to ensure that auditors of public companies do not have conflicts of
interest that would affect their integrity in auditing financial statements.
35. Donald C. Langevoort & Robert B. Thompson, “Publicness” in Contemporary
Securities Regulation After the JOBS Act, 101 GEO. L.J. 337, 380 (2013).
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36

integrity and accountability to shareholders.”
For example,
exchanges now require listed companies to have boards with a
37
38
majority of independent directors. After Sarbanes-Oxley and
39
Dodd-Frank, important board committees such as the audit and
executive compensation committees must consist entirely of
40
independent directors. This move towards board independence seeks
to ensure that corporate governance of public companies has integrity
by removing conflicts of interest, some of which can facilitate fraud.
Public companies have not only been distinguished through
greater regulation, but also through efforts that seek to reduce
regulatory costs for companies that are so established that the
integrity of their valuations should not be in doubt. Under certain
circumstances, companies that have already offered registered
securities to the public may file registration statements that are not as
41
extensive as unseasoned companies. This more lenient regulation
reflects the belief that the valuation of corporations that have been
public for some time is reliable enough to raise capital with fewer
42
restrictions.
While all public companies must meet certain standards, it is
important to acknowledge that investors cannot expect all such
companies to be equally trustworthy. Large public companies have
more resources than small public companies to ensure the reliability
of their disclosures. Moreover, when a significant public corporation

36. NYSE Manual § 301.00.
37. Id. at § 303A.01.
38. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 15 and 18 U.S.C.A. (West 2015)).
39. Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, Pub. L. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of U.S.C.A. (West 2015)).
40. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 301, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j-1 (West 2015); 17 C.F.R. §
240.10A-3 (2015); see also Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 § 952, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j-3; 17 C.F.R. §
240.10C-1(b)(1) (2015).
41. Such an issuer may SEC Form S-3, which incorporates by reference the information in
periodic filings. The most commonly used test for determining whether a market is efficient
considers whether the issuer is a Form S-3 filer. See Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264, 1286–
87 (D.N.J. 1989). Moreover, if a company meets certain size thresholds, it will be considered a
Well-Known-Seasoned Issuer that can offer securities to the public with even fewer restrictions
than seasoned issuers. See Securities Offering Reform, Securities Act Release No. 8591,
Exchange Act Release No. 52,056, Investment Company Release No. 26,993, 70 Fed. Reg.
44,722, 44,726–30 (Aug. 3, 2005).
42. The timing of some of these reforms suggests that regulators are trying to offset the
costs of Sarbanes-Oxley by loosening regulation of public companies in other areas. See James J.
Park, Two Trends in the Regulation of the Public Corporation, 8 OHIO ST. ENTREPRENEURIAL
BUS. L.J. 429 (2012).
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fails in the wake of a fraud, there will be a greater social impact than
when a small public corporation fails. Professors Langevoort and
Thompson have thus argued that “[f]ull publicness treatment should
43
be reserved for companies with a larger societal footprint.” At the
same time, all public companies must meet basic regulatory mandates,
and even though there will be questions as to whether the line
between public and private corporations has been drawn correctly,
investors should be able to reasonably expect that public companies
will generally be safer investments than private companies.
The distinctiveness of public companies goes beyond technical
requirements of greater accuracy in disclosure and corporate
governance. Professor Hillary Sale notes that after a period of scandal
and failure to understand their obligations to the public, corporations
increasingly operate in a climate of increasing government and public
44
scrutiny with respect to their integrity as public companies.
Corporations that fail to meet social norms with respect to their
conduct will face public backlash that can affect their business as well
as their stock price. These demands for integrity require investment in
compliance efforts by public companies, and the demand for such
efforts is likely to grow.
III. INVESTOR RELIANCE AND THE PUBLIC CORPORATION
Shifting attention from market integrity to the integrity of the
public corporation has a number of implications for the fraud-on-themarket presumption. When a stock trades on a public market, it is not
reasonable for investors to believe that its price is never distorted by
fraud, but it is reasonable for investors to believe that its price is not
severely distorted by fraud. This reliance is consistent with the
increasing expectation that public corporations trading on a stock
exchange meet basic levels of integrity. To the extent that securities
class actions mainly police the integrity of the public corporation,
courts should shape Rule 10b-5 doctrine to focus on the most
significant frauds, such as hiding the fact that a company is heading
towards bankruptcy.
The normative case for the fraud-on-the-market presumption is
best supported by the extensive role of the law in distinguishing

43. Langevoort & Thompson, Publicness, supra note 35, at 342.
44. Hillary A. Sale, The New “Public” Corporation, 74 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 137, 139
(2011).
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between public and private companies. When a market for a
particular stock is efficient, it is the culmination of a long process
where a company goes from a private company that is difficult to
value, to a public company that outsiders are comfortable valuing.
Such a company will be tested by gatekeepers such as private
investors, underwriters, auditors, exchanges, and research analysts
before emerging on the public markets. When an investor purchases a
stock on the New York Stock Exchange, he justifiably has more
confidence in the value of that security than if it were trading on the
penny stock market. Though fulfilling the requirements of becoming a
public company is no guarantee against fraud, these standards are
meant to assure investors that the most severe frauds will be rare. The
investor trusts markets not because market prices are always accurate
but because law and norms help screen out companies that should not
be publicly traded.
Any company trading on a public market represents that it is
meeting the requirements for being a public company in good faith.
To the extent that there is a change in the company’s condition
indicating that this implicit representation is no longer true, the
company should disclose such a development to investors. Even if the
company’s stock price does not precisely reflect its fundamental value,
the fact that the company continues to trade implies that it continues
to meet standards for remaining a public company.
Investors purchasing a stock that trades on an efficient market
should be able to rely on the representation that the company should
be trading on a public market. This reliance can be violated by a
company that commits significant fraud. A severe fraud can hide the
fact that a company is heading towards bankruptcy or delisting. Many
securities class actions have targeted such severe frauds. As one of my
earlier papers shows, about 15 percent of the securities class actions
45
filed from 1996–2004 involved companies that filed for bankruptcy.
In hiding significant information from the public, a company may
continue to trade on an exchange when in fact it should be in

45. James J. Park, Securities Class Actions and Bankrupt Companies, 111 MICH. L. REV.
547, 550 (2013). Securities frauds became more severe in the early part of the 2000s, as
evidenced by the increasing percentage of cases where bondholders, who are typically shielded
from securities fraud, recovered some part of a securities class action settlement. See James J.
Park, Bondholders and Securities Class Actions, 99 MINN. L. REV. 585, 587 (2014). Nineteen of
the thirty largest securities class action settlements of cases filed from 1996 to 2005 involved a
bondholder recovery.
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bankruptcy court or trading on the pink sheets. Investors who
continue to purchase stock without knowledge of such fundamental
developments can argue that their reliance on the integrity of the
46
company as a public corporation has been disrupted.
It is important to acknowledge that expectations with respect to
public companies have evolved significantly since the fraud-on-themarket presumption was adopted by the Supreme Court in 1988,
more than a decade before the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley. But even
then, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act had been in place since the
1970s, requiring internal controls and truthful books and records.
Moreover, the fact that the severe frauds associated with Enron and
WorldCom triggered the significant intervention of Sarbanes-Oxley is
evidence that those frauds violated investor expectations with respect
to the integrity of a public corporation. Finally, the Court in
Halliburton v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. affirmed the validity of the
fraud-on-the-market presumption in the context of a post-SarbanesOxley world that requires more of public companies.
Not all securities frauds would disrupt investor reliance on the
integrity of the public corporation. It is unrealistic to believe that
internal controls and listing requirements will stop all frauds, but they
should prevent the most severe frauds absent extraordinary efforts to
evade regulatory requirements. Shifting the normative focus of fraudon-the-market suits to protection of the integrity of the public
corporation might support efforts to dismiss cases involving minor
stock price fluctuations. If investors do not believe that stock prices
are exactly accurate, the case for allowing recovery for a temporary
decline in a company’s stock price is weaker.
Because the reliance interest of investors is narrower under an
integrity of the public corporation approach, an argument can be
made that the doctrine governing securities class actions should also
be narrowed to focus on the most significant frauds. For example, the
test for determining whether a misstatement is material enough to
support securities fraud liability could be refined in light of this
Article’s analysis. If the reasonable investor relies on the integrity of
the public corporation rather than the accuracy of a particular market
46. Even when a stock does not trade in an efficient market, some courts have found that
an investor’s reliance interest can be affected by significant violations of market integrity. When
a company sells a security that is essentially unmarketable, investors can argue that they “relied
on the integrity of the offerings” in purchasing the security. Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462, 469
(5th Cir. 1981).
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price, there will be a stronger case that a narrower range of
misstatements will be material to that investor. To be material, a fraud
must do more than affect stock prices—it must hide a fundamental
change that would lead to questions about whether a company should
47
be public. Such a materiality standard would reduce the costs of
defending suits without merit by making it more likely that such cases
48
will be dismissed at an early stage.
An objection to this approach is that smaller frauds can be
significant as well. Larger frauds may often be the culmination of
multiple decisions to manipulate disclosures in what seem to be minor
ways. Even if private class actions are not as viable for such cases, the
SEC could fill the gap. Such smaller frauds may be well-suited for a
bureaucracy with the resources to pursue cases even when they may
not be economically viable for private firms.
CONCLUSION
In affirming Basic Inc. v. Levinson’s assumption that investors rely
on the integrity of efficient markets, the decision of the Court in
Halliburton v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. rests on an uneasy foundation.
It is difficult to argue that investors believe market prices are rarely
distorted by fraud. Professor Langevoort has thus described the
49
fraud-on-the-market presumption as one of juristic grace, and
Halliburton does not provide a reason to change his conclusion. This
Article seeks to provide a firmer normative foundation for the
presumption of reliance that makes securities class actions under
Rule 10b-5 possible. The reliance is not on market prices, but in the
extensive law and norms that have defined the public corporation for
many years. These efforts strive to eliminate severe frauds from public
markets. Even if investors cannot rely on the integrity of market

47. As I have argued elsewhere, materiality should be narrowed to focus on fraud that
significantly distorts the fundamentals of the company. See James J. Park, Assessing the
Materiality of Financial Misstatements, 34 J. CORP. L. 513 (2009).
48. Defendants may object that a stronger materiality standard is not of much help to
them because it is difficult to win a materiality argument on a motion to dismiss. But it is
unclear why public corporations could not make an effort to select cases that are weak on
materiality to go to trial. In doing so, they would create more law on the issue, making it easier
to dismiss cases in the future, as well as deter plaintiffs from bringing strike suits in the future.
49. Langevoort, Basic at Twenty, supra note 17, at 195; see also Barbara Black, Behavioral
Economics and Investor Protection: Reasonable Investors, Efficient Markets, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.
J. 1493, 1502 (2013) (“At its core, however, Basic is a pragmatic, not a theoretical opinion based
on the purposes of the federal securities laws, including the protection of investors and the
enhancement of investor confidence.”).
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prices, they should be able to rely on the integrity of the public
corporation.

